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 efle tions on t e Anal sis of Counterfa tual  ro ositions 
an  Alternative  istor    e ulative  i tion a out   I 
 
    r   r on  
 
   a  e  e onde  dan  l in iniment grand  dan  l in iniment  etit  
dan  l in iniment lointain  il y a  e t  tre  n  ni er    i na t 
 omme le n tre e t né   
(Bernard Werber:  e   o rmi . Albin Michel S.A.: Paris, 1991, p.  2) 
 
   don t kno  any   ork  o  alternati e  i tory  i tion a o t       Pro a ly  e a  e     i  al ay  
o er  ado ed  y       and  e ore     t e Great  ar  a  too  orri le in t e mind o  t e  eo le t at 
t ey d make     alternati e  i tory  a o t it    d  ay   
(Banned user “Max Sinister”, commenting on why he is not aware of any piece of alternative history 
speculative fiction about WWI, on a forum hosted at alternatehistory.com.) 
 
A stra t 
This article offers a brief overview of the challenges of assessing counterfactual 
statements in terms of plausibility, to then consider the reasons for the comparative 
scarcity of WWI alternative histories in published alternative history (AH) speculative 
fiction. The relative rarity of such fiction may be striking, given the popularity of the 
notion that the event of the nearly-botched assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, 
heir presumptive to the throne of Austria-Hungary, in 191 , in Sara evo   in a sense a 
small, improbable event   was the decisive trigger of the conflict. Explaining the 
comparative lack of AH in the light of a systematic understanding of the difficulties of 
counterfactual analysis may be as interesting for literary theory as to political analysis. 
The article closes with a discussion of the few relevant pieces of genre literature that have 
been identified during the course of the research for this piece. 
 
 e  or s: alternative history, speculative fiction, counterfactuals, counterfactual 
analysis, World War I 
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Intro u tion    e various  in s of  ounterfa tual anal sis an  t eir  o  ination 
Whatever some historians say, addressing the plausibility of propositions in response to 
“What if ” type  uestions is intrinsic to thinking about politics and strategy, be this 
addressed explicitly or only implicitly. Every explanation rests on assumptions of what 
could have happened differently if we alter something in the past course of events, and 
every prediction rests on assumptions of what the preconditions for a valid prediction are, 
in the absence of which something else might come to happen. For instance: Was the 
assassination of Franz Ferdinand a necessary and sufficient condition for WWI, or was it 
merely sufficient (so that other triggers might have set off a similar conflict in its 
absence)  Should Franz Ferdinand have survived, were his views really such that the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy may have avoided a disastrous war under his influence  
These complex and complicated  uestions can be unpacked from the seemingly more 
simple  uestions of “What was the reason for WWI ” and “What were Franz Ferdinand’s 
views of the future of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy ” 
Various established approaches to counterfactual analysis exist in the political 
sciences literature. This paper considers the most important difference between these 
approaches their divergence in terms of their respective epistemological and ontological 
positions – a difference that shall be better illuminated below. In particular, this article 
shall refer to four important sources in detail in this introductory discussion: Sylvan and 
Ma eski, 199    ebow, 2010  Harvey, 2012  and Hendrickson, 2012. 
Slyvan and Ma eski’s work is fairly uni ue in an epistemological sense in that it 
is looking to make hard counterfactual statements  i  t i    t en t at  whereas  ebow 
doubts if truly “robust” (i.e. definitively pronounced) counterfactuals can ever be made. 
In line with  ebow’s approach, Harvey is satisfied by posing a sufficiently strong 
challenge to dominant but in fact weak counterfactual assumptions that are present in 
public thinking, by the systemic and comprehensive collection of evidence – 
comprehensive in the sense of accounting for all possible variations of counterfactual 
statements regarding a certain event  i  t i   t en   t i    nder  ertain  ondition  OR 
t at   nder ot er  alternati e  ondition    Upon the consideration of these three sources, 
Hendrickson’s propositions regarding “antecedent scenarios” shall also be considered 
here, to integrate the different approaches into a pragmatic doctrine of comprehensive 
counterfactual analysis. 
In a nutshell, Sylvan and Ma eski (199 ) focus not so much on the plausibility (or 
relative possibility) of a given alternative reality or “possible world”, or in other words 
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on the “miracle” or change that it would take to lead to said alternative reality. Rather, 
they are interested in ontological consistency. In other words: theirs is an essentialist 
approach interested in determining the ne e  ary as well as the  ontingent  ualities of 
key analytical units or “entities” in any given world. This necessitates the identification 
of “essence”, so that given entities be the  ame across different possible worlds. This is 
opposed to a “cluster” notion of identity whereby entities would have only closely or less 
resembling “counterparts,” as opposed to fully identical pairs, across various worlds. 
Were we to take the latter approach we could not “rigidly designate” entities by any name 
valid across different possible worlds, as in any different possible world no truly fully 
matching entity could be found, and thus all-encompassing truth claims could not be made 
concerning counterparts (and, per conse uence, counterfactuals). Certain traits in the 
cluster or constellation of various  ualities that define an entity thus need to be ne e  ary 
(and specified as such) for us to engage in meaningful analysis. Some of these traits will 
be monadic, i.e., stand-alone traits, but they may also be n-adic (dyadic, triadic etc.), i.e., 
a  uality emerging from the combination of two or more specific monadic traits. 
Sylvan and Ma eski use this approach in the study of abstract, socially constructed 
entities such as “policy recommendations,” of potential interest to us in looking at 
decision alternatives in different contexts, as is the case with many counterfactuals put 
forward regarding WWI (Sylvan and Ma eski, 199 :  0-  ). Sylvan and Ma eski are 
interested in identifying what policy recommendations ( ualifying as such as a result of 
having the essential traits of “policy recommendation”) may be “winnable” (a contingent 
property) in a given historical context. Such contingent properties should, in their 
approach, be deduced on the basis of a conception of essential, i.e. constitutive relations 
between contingent properties. In other words, with sufficient information about both 
essence and contingent properties, one may draw conclusions regarding even unknown 
contingent properties (199 :   - 9). Winnability can thus be gauged according to our 
understanding of the mix of essential and contingent properties across various different 
possible worlds, and how they interrelate with one another. 
Importantly, this approach “brackets” antecedent and succeeding sections of 
causal chains and is only looking to define the constitutive relations between phenomena 
across various stipulated possible worlds at a given point along the event horizon, without 
regard to the likelihood (the relative possibility) of their coming about from a set of 
necessary conditions (199 :  9-90). It is interested in “comparability” rather than relative 
possibility, and comparability stems from the presence of certain essentially identical 
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phenomena across different stipulated worlds in co-temporaneous snapshots of such 
parallelly possible realities. 
In this way, Sylvan and Ma eski’s approach to the study of policy 
recommendations may function as an important test of counterfactual propositions 
regarding, e.g., decision alternatives: by showing what alternative, non-implemented 
policy options ought to be considered as especially relevant counterfactuals in the first 
place, from the point of view of “winnability.” This may be relevant in what-if scenarios 
for “same-government” as well as “different-government” possible worlds.  
Harvey (2012: 2 -  ) outlines a different approach which may complement the 
one outlined by Slyvan and Ma eski in eventual policy analysis, especially if used in 
con unction with Hendrickson’s work (2012  to be discussed below). Harvey uses a very 
neat and parsimonious plausibility test of counterfactual propositions in the form of a 
two-by-two matrix of interconnected counterfactuals, or two pairs of such statements, 
whereby the pairs differ in terms of a supposedly essential property, while the members 
of each pair relate to each other as mutually exclusive assumptions. In other words, 
instead of the “if B (instead of A)   then D (instead of C)” proposition of a typical 
counterfactual statement, we should be interested in looking at a set of propositions along 
the logic of “either A, or B”  “if A   then C or D”  “if B   then C or D.” 
Such a set of assumptions may be seen as logically stemming from any historical 
causal thesis, and the one put forward will in effect be but one of four different statements 
from the matrix mentioned above  hence the need for unbiased, open-ended testing. In 
line with this, evidence then needs to be collected, and upon “a careful (and complete) 
review of the relevant historical record,” one needs to decide “Which  of the four mutually 
exclusive options  receives the strongest support” (Harvey, 2012: 2 ). Two of the most 
important benefits of this method highlighted by Harvey are simplicity or parsimony, and 
utility for various different disciplines interested in investigating causation with their own 
theories and conceptual repertoire. There is simplicity in this, as any evidence serving as 
the strength of one explanation in either of the pairs of mutually exclusive counterfactuals 
is by default proof against the other member of the same pair. Utility for various 
 
  Sylvan and Ma eski propose a very elaborate doctrine for such analysis that builds on a peculiar, rigid 
(albeit not altogether unrealistic) notion of decision-making (with specific regard to U.S. foreign policy 
decision-making) as well as on a set of assumptions regarding   en new policy recommendations can come 
forward (when current policy fails according to given criteria) and  o  a policy recommendation can kill 
its competing alternatives (according to what criteria). This paper is interested less in developing an 
alternative doctrine of this kind or in utilizing theirs, and more in demonstrating how a pragmatic approach 
can combine some of the elements from this kind of analysis with other approaches. 
 .  ARTON  CO O RN              
  i    .             .    v      
    
 
disciplines on the other hand is a product of the careful process-tracing re uired in 
investigating causation, whereby detailed case histories and outlines of the most 
important (and generalizable) causal mechanisms may emerge, tested as to whether they 
conform to existing theoretical understandings of the processes concerned (Harvey, 2012: 
  -  ). In essence, this is the approach proposed by  ebow as well (2012). 
Harvey designed his approach for the purposes of examining a “Gore War 
counterfactual” in the context of the events of 200  and U.S. military action against 
Saddam Hussein’s regime in Ira , in terms of plausibility, in the face of what he calls the 
“Neoconist” account of the Ira  war which tends to emphasize the role of neoconservative 
ideological influences and President George W. Bush’s assumed personality traits as the 
chief factors explaining why the Ira  war took place. 
Different-government counterfactuals are relevant in the case of other countries 
as well, not only with regards to the U.S., in the context of the war in Ira  (as well as in 
other contexts). In a cascade of if then propositions similar to Neoconist arguments, 
Dyson (200 , 200 ) concludes that Tony Blair made a decisive difference as to British 
policy, especially in terms of the nature and size of the British contribution to the Ira  
war, whereas the Central-Eastern European (CEE) version of the argument, in Mikulova’s 
thesis (2011), is that a network of “Atlanticist” politicians and public figures made the 
participation of CEE countries in the Ira  war possible. These thus seem to be versions 
of the “Neoconist” interpretation in an analogical sense, be they valid or not – with PM 
Tony Blair pulling the United Kingdom into one particular possible world in the first, and 
with Atlanticists functioning as substitutes for the neoconservatives in the case of 
Central Eastern European countries as the key decision-shapers.  
Harvey makes a powerful case against such simplifying accounts in the case of 
the U.S. as he points out that the mainstream counterfactual of “No Bush   No War” 
does not address the possibility of a different administration (in this case, the Al Gore 
administration) going to war. In Harvey’s final assessment, this may almost certainly be 
a mistake with regards to an Al Gore administration which may well have decided in 
favor of military action. Harvey demonstrates this point with an extensive set of  uotes 
from speeches and other texts, carefully sourced and contextualized, that reflect and 
document Al Gore’s, as well as some of his most likely advisors’, hawkish leanings, along 
with their specific preferences on Ira  policy in favor of coercive diplomacy. A Gore 
administration’s policy may, thus, have led, albeit along a different causal path, to war, 
through the UN,  ust as the Bush administration decided to proceed initially. To  uote but 
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one source taking a similar view, not cited by Harvey himself: “The most hawkish 
Democrats, since the 1990s, had essentially embraced conservative internationalism, 
rather than offering something very different” (Zelizer, 2010:   9). 
To nevertheless offer a more refined assessment here: Georgia Senator Max 
Cleland, as surely many may have felt at the time, explained this stance of many 
Democrats with reference to the constraints of electoral politics on the eve of the 2002 
elections to the Senate, and said that in his view he would have been “dead meat in the 
race” if he would not have taken a sufficiently tough stance on Ira  (Zelizer, 2010:    ). 
This clearly pertains to the issue of “winnability” raised by Sylvan and Ma eski. 
But the sources of  ome Democrats’ actions (acting under constraints rather than very 
eagerly, out of a genuine personal conviction) may not make much of a difference in the 
end, in terms of what is key to the counterfactual of a Gore administration directing the 
same more skeptical Democrats out of their own  uite strong conviction of the need to 
remove Saddam Hussein from power. Zelizer is careful to note that “the yea vote 
 authorizing the President to use force against Ira   was larger than the one for the elder 
Bush’s operation in 1991  authorizing the use of force to liberate Kuwait ” (Zelizer, 2010: 
   ). 
  Harvey’s approach is interesting in that it sets out to do what Sylvan and Ma eski 
do in a different way as well. Both Harvey and Sylvan and Ma eski use an approach that 
well reflects  ebow’s warning that our world may not be the most probable of all possible 
worlds. Sylvan and Ma eski, by considering parameters of winnability in the case of 
foreign policy recommendations, ask  uestions about how even the same government 
may have acted differently, and implicitly they offer a way to assess how a different 
government may have acted differently (or in the same way), thus accounting for all of 
Harvey’s variations  in essence, this is entirely compatible with what Harvey’s matrix 
sets out as the right approach to counterfactual analysis. 
Adapting Sylvan and Ma eski’s as well Harvey’s approach in a pragmatic 
combination, willfully disregarding some of their epistemological and ontological 
incompatibilities, one may develop an integrated approach to assess both what different 
things may have been regarded at the time as viable or winnable policy options by any 
government (including the same government), as well as whether different governments 
may have done different things. Thus one establishes “internal” plausibility conditions 
for alternative possible worlds, within which an innermost circle is to be differentiated as 
well. The innermost plausibility conditions are those that pertain to the preferences or 
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winnability criteria specific to a certain government (“specific preferences”), whilst the 
outer layer of internal plausibility conditions are those that pertain to the winnability 
parameters inherent in the decision-making situation, i.e. in the structural constraints or 
the opportunity structure of the situation (“structural constraints”). 
Such an approach works especially if, in addition, it takes note of the importance 
of “antecedent scenario” development, which Hendrickson suggests should be included 
in any truly thorough counterfactual analysis (2012). 
To some degree, the burden of the invention of plausible antecedent scenarios may 
be placed on those who subscribe to the thesis that the same government may have done 
different things or that different leaders would or could have implemented different 
policies. In examining counterfactual propositions, one needs to consider the plausibility 
of the antecedent events they imply, to appreciate the relative significance of different 
such propositions. Thus, one can establish the “external” plausibility conditions of 
alternative possible worlds. 
With this, pragmatic counterfactual analysis now has three different layers of 
plausibility conditions to in uire about, at decreasing levels of absolute plausibility, as 
portrayed in the scheme below. These all pertain to the assessment of plausible alternative 
outcomes along the lines of four fundamentally different scenarios, denoted with the 
numbers 0, 1, 2, and  , respectively, in  ig re  . The “zero counterfactual” is what 
 ebow, Sylvan and Ma eski, and Harvey all draw attention to, namely that under certain 
conditions different decisions may have been possible by the same government – the 
world of the actual decision is not the only possible world and not necessarily the most 
probable world. 
Thus, even without antecedent changes, decision-making could have produced 
different results, within the innermost plausibility conditions. The other three scenarios 
all re uire what are, in principle, increasingly implausible antecedent scenarios to offer 
plausible outcomes (increasingly implausible given that more bigger changes are re uired 
by them). 
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 i ure    Counterfa tual s enarios: (0) Same government comes to different 
decision  (1) Structural winnability parameters are altered   a  ing   ange in  tr  t ral 
 on traint   t     a  ing  o  i ly di  erent de i ion  y  ame a   ell a  di  erent 
go ernment   (2) Actor-specific winnability parameters are altered   a  ing di  erent 
de i ion  y t e  ame go ernment   ( ) Actor is altered   a  ing di  erent go ernment  
 it  di  erent   e i i   re eren e  . 
 
In the case of same-government counterfactuals, analysis would need to show how 
“winnability” may have come to be differently assessed by those involved in decision-
making within the boundary parameters determined by internal plausibility conditions 
(specific preferences   structural constraints). 
In the case of different-government counterfactuals, one would need to assess, 
beyond how specific preferences and structural constraints may have affected that 
government’s decision, the  uestion of how the alternative leaders may have come to 
power, as a result of what intervention in the original course of events, within the 
boundary parameters determined by external plausibility conditions. Most fre uently, in 
the analysis of leadership in democratic polities, this would entail an explanation of how 
elections could have seen the people concerned come to power, instead of the actual 
government of the day. More often than not, in terms of Hendrickson’s paradigm, this 
would mean either an unusually large amount of small, localized miracles in the form of 
a mass of individual voters deciding differently, when casting their ballots, or an 
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explanation specifying a ma or event intervening before the elections to cause such 
changes of mind on the part of said critical mass of voters.  
Antecedent scenarios also have to be addressed in considering how “intermediate 
states,” i.e. everything that would or could have happened in-between an implied 
antecedent, e.g. the coming to power of alternative leaders, and the posited resulting 
outcomes, e.g. decisions related to the Ira  war, could have affected policy. This is 
especially important if one is interested in several different counterfactual propositions 
related to different points in time altogether, related to which plausibility values have to 
be re-considered with the entry of each new counterfactual element, according to the rules 
of Bayesian updating. For instance, it may be implausible, in a given context, to argue 
that some of the same important events that government A would have experienced would 
not have affected government B in acting out its inherently different preferences in terms 
of policies implemented. 
To connect the above discussion once again to the analysis of WWI: 
counterfactual propositions about WWI abound, including counterfactual antecedent 
scenarios. For instance, consider the example of Spellberg’s proposition (in effect, a 
“different-decisions” counterfactual proposition) that avoiding Clausewitz’s untimely 
death due to cholera in 1  1 may have resulted in a more extensive revision (basically, a 
more consistent revision) by him of his  n  ar, limiting the popularity after his death of 
the notion of absolute war and the idea of the need to seek decisive engagement with 
enemy forces – thus possibly leading to a WWI fought very differently (200 : 111  taking 
this argument partly from  iddell Hart’s Strategy). 
 
  e relative s orta e of alternative  istor  s e ulative fi tion a out   I 
One popular book on the sub ect, a piece of non-fiction, edited by Tsouras and Jones 
(201 ) outlines various “alternate histories” of WWI based on the following propositions: 
“How would the war have changed had the Germans not attacked France but turned 
their main thrust against Russia  had the Greeks  oined the allies at Gallipoli  or had 
the British severed the communications of the Ottoman Empire at Alexandretta  
What if there was a more decisive outcome at Jutland  if the alternative plans for the 
Battle of the Somme in 191  had been put into effect  or if the Americans intervened 
in 191 , rather 191  ” (From the publisher’s description of the book.) 
As this example of a piece of work on the sub ect may show, there is a considerable record 
of thought about the many possible points of divergence along the event horizon of WWI. 
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Stemming from these, different events could have followed along different causal paths 
during WWI. It may be worth noting with a view to the previous sections of this article 
that most of the above scenarios can be categorised as “same-government different-
decision” scenarios, even as they may feature different alternate generals military 
commanders in the military decision-making. Opening the door to “different-
government” counterfactuals and counterfactual antecedent scenarios can only add to the 
diversity of deviations imaginable. 
A cursory glance at Wikipedia’s list of “alternate history fiction”   at 
https:  en.wikipedia.org wiki  ist of alternate history fiction   reveals the far greater 
relative availability of WWII alternative history fiction compared to what the genre has 
to offer about WWI. A search for key terms confirms this:  0 hits for “world war II”, 
compared to  ust   for “world war I” (as of 2  September 2019). Uchronia.net, a ma or 
resource for fans of alternative histories, lists    relevant items with points of divergence 
during the period of 191  to 191  (as of 2  September 2019), including pieces of non-
fiction (analytical-speculative works, including scholarly works), in its “Divergence 
Chronology” at http:  www.uchronia.net bib.cgi diverge.html. In the meantime, there are 
  2 works listed there for the period of 19 9 to 19  .  
 We can only speculate about the reasons for this. As internet user “Max Sinister” 
alludes to this in what is  uoted in the motto for this article, WWI is part of WWII’s 
antecedent scenario, and any alternative history fiction produced post-WWII about WWI 
would have to, inevitably, touch upon the sub ect of how WWII is affected by it (“What 
WWII, again ”). This is a potentially complicated undertaking – it is not against the 
nature of alternative history fiction in general to take on a challenge like this, but it is a 
challenge nonetheless. Re-writing WWII is also problematic, somewhat, in an ethical 
sense, given how the losses of WWII affected nearly everyone around the world in one 
way or another, and that investing emotionally in such a story may thus be overly 
demanding to some readers (an argument that may be important from the perspective of 
an author’s  uest for popularity as well as that of a publisher’s marketing).  
Further, WWII offers a much clearer moral set-up of good vs. evil   a strong 
consensus on who was on the right and the wrong side of history, respectively. Universal 
human rights, declared, as we now take them for granted, after WWII, constitute a 
universal benchmark against which deeds of the combatant parties can be measured, and 
it fairly and s uarely places Nazi Germany in the antagonist’s role in all works of fiction 
(apart from revisionist and outright Fascist propaganda that only mas uerades as fiction). 
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For WWI, meanwhile, a typical narrative, a narrative denying that the parties involved 
would have had real agency as such in bringing the conflict about, and which exerts its 
influence up to this day, is the tale of “sliding into war”, or “slithering” over the brink 
into “the cauldron of war” as British Prime Minister David  loyd George once said   
even though this does not really stand up to closer scrutiny (Hamilton and Herwig, 200 : 
2 2). 
Finally, to be able to speak about the complexity of the events of WWI in the form 
of alternative history speculative fiction, a re uirement is not only that there be creative 
and inventive enough authors but that there be a mature readership as well: one that can 
appreciate historical nuance examined from a more or less neutral perspective – a 
necessary trait of high- uality speculative fiction about alternative histories. Naturally, 
this condition is harder to meet in societies where collective memory is, to this day, not 
at peace with the outcome of WWI. 
 
An overvie  of  n lis  lan ua e  or s of alternative  istor  s e ulative fi tion 
a out   I 
Based on a reasonable (and partly crowd-sourced) effort to compile an initial list of 
relevant works for exploration, the following items have been identified which could be 
obtained or regarding which sufficient information was found, for the overview below: 
 
   Kurt Busiek and Carlos Pacheco: Arrowsmith (series of comics published as a 
book by Wildstorm, 200 , ISBN-1 : 9  -1 0120299 ) 
   Jon Courtenay Grimwood: Arabesk (“Pashazade”, “Effendi”, “Felaheen”  a 
trilogy of novels published from 2001 to 200 , available in a single volume from 
Gollancz) 
   William Sanders: The Wild Blue and the Gray (Grand Central, 1991, ISBN-1 : 
9  -0     1 22  novel) 
   Robert Egerton Swartwout: It Might Have Happeed (W Heffer   Sons, 19  ) 
   Harry Turtledove: Uncle Alf (in:  lternate General    , anthology, Baen, 2002  
short story) 
   Harry Turtledove: The Great War (“American Front”  “Walk in Hell”, 
“Breakthroughs”  a trilogy of novels re-published by Del Ray, 200 ) 
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   Scott Westerfield:  eviathan (Simon Pulse, 2010, ISBN-1 : 9  1 1 9 1  0  an 
illustrated novel) 
 
It may be important to note that there are other relevant works that are based on a point 
of divergence before (in some cases, long before) WWI, causing an alteration of the 
character and causal chain of WWI (if and to the extent that it happens at all). Such is, for 
example, Kim Stanley Robinsons’ T e  ear  o   i e and Salt (Bantam Books, 2002). 
There are also non-English works of this kind, such as    zi ar a    tol    t a   e ezetek 
a   na menti K ztár a ág t rténeté  l by Bence Pintér and Máté Pintér (Agave, 
Budapest, 2012, ISBN: 9   1  0 99 1). Such works are, however, not considered here 
in detail, with a view to WWI being outside their central focus. A further issue of 
delineation is that only pieces of fiction that have a clear point of divergence, i.e., a turn 
of events leading to alternative outcomes (along with open-ended alternative historical 
event horizons), may count as alternative history fiction, at least for our purposes here: 
otherwise any piece of fiction taking place in WWI (if its causal chain is bracketed by 
actual events) could be of relevance. Time-machine and parallel-reality-traveling stories 
have also been excluded from the in uiry. 
 Of the above-listed, Scott Westerfield’s  e iat an and Kurt Busiek’s  rro  mit  
(an illustrated novel and a comic book, respectively) use a lot of fantasy elements, moving 
(far) away from a down-to-earth narrative’s generally greater interest in plausibility, even 
as they capture certain societal, economic and political dynamics rather well. One features 
the mechanized forces of the “Clankers” (the Central Powers in our universe) against the 
“Darwinist” forces (the Entente Powers) that have mastered biological warfare as a result 
of a massive revolution in biotechnology and are thus relying on the power of engineered 
organisms. The other depicts a world of magic and spells, where the Allies face off with 
the Prussians, and dragons, ogres, vampires and other monsters add to the ranks of the 
combatant parties. The protagonist, Fletcher Arrowsmith (notably, carrying a nom de 
g erre by birth),  oins the war in a world in the process of being reshaped by commercial 
wizardry, thus reflecting by analogy the spread of technology (as Arthur Clarke famously 
observed: advanced technology is practically indistinguishable from magic) and the 
expansion of capitalism. 
 Robert Egerton Swartwout’s  t Mig t  a e  a  ened     ket   o  t e later  areer 
o     ert  i ter   denard   ir t  arl o  Sly e  et   (from 19  ) is built on a complex 
antecedent scenario, where  ord Randolph Churchill (1  9-1 9 ), Winston Churchill’s 
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father, does not die an untimely death but fulfils his potential (attributed to him by many 
of his contemporaries, a key piece of information in terms of plausibility) to become a 
central figure in British politics. Swartwout uses a pseudonym for  ord Randolph 
Churchill, but the similarities speak for themselves. Beyond these similarities, the story 
leads to a very different universe, with WWI cut short, peace and stability resulting, and 
Hitler, conse uently, not coming to power in Germany. 
 The U.S. Civil War is a source of points of divergence with direct relevance for 
WWI, both for William Sanders in the novel T e  ild Bl e and t e Gray and for Harry 
Turtledove in his T e Great  ar trilogy. The former presents a universe where the lands 
of what we know as the United States of America are divided between three different 
parties, the Union States, the Confederate States of America (CSA) and the Five Civilized 
Tribes – the latter two are allies, with a Cherokee protagonist  oining the CSA’s ranks on 
the French front in the story. Turtledove’s series pits the United States of America, the 
losing party in the Civil War, against the CSA on the side of the European powers, whose 
conflict pulls them into the war, with the USA allied to Germany and Austria-Hungary, 
and the CSA as an ally of the United Kingdom and France.  
 In the meantime, featuring intra-WWI points of divergence, Jon Courtenay 
Grimwood’s  ra e k trilogy sees WWI cut short by a peace agreement brokered by 
President Wilson, with the combat limited mostly to the Balkans. Even more 
interestingly, the scene for the story is a liberal Ottoman North Africa, addressing the 
counterfactual of what would have been the fate of the Ottoman Empire in the absence of 
a drawn-out WWI. 
 ast but not least, Harry Turtledove’s brilliant short story,  n le  l , builds on the 
premise of a better-constructed German offensive in the West, resulting in the long-lasting 
occupation of France, where the German occupiers are gradually but surely undergoing 
acculturation to French norms, resisted only by die-hard purists such as the rather scary 
anti-hero of the story. 
 As these examples may demonstrate, authors of speculative fiction are creative 
and inventive enough to be able to come up with various scenarios for diverse points of 
divergence, including antecedent as well as intra-WWI points of divergence. The socially 
and historically critical character of some of these works is visible in how they choose 
premises for their stories that are moderately to highly uncomfortable for readers 
accustomed to the universe we currently live in.  
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 Naturally, what is available in the English language may later in time be 
complemented with the translations of non-English works, such as Christian Kracht’s 
Alternativweltgeschichte      erde  ier  ein im Sonnen   ein  nd im S  atten (I will be 
here, in the sunlight and the shade, 200 ), where the Swiss Soviet Republic (SSR) comes 
into being after  enin remains in exile there – that is, because Russia suffers devastation 
from a much more drastic version of the 190  Tungushka event (the book is available, as 
of 2019, in Russian, Bulgarian, Dutch, Polish, Swedish, Korean, Norwegian and Croatian, 
but not in English). 
 
Con lusion 
As the above analysis and overview may show, there is value in studying counterfactuals 
as well as insights offered about the plausibility of various points of divergence and 
counterfactual scenarios in works of speculative fiction. It may strongly stimulate 
historians’ and social scientists’ thinking about counterfactual scenarios, compelling them 
to strive for more realistic speculation about “what if” type propositions, which is an 
inherent part of their work, regardless of whether they admit this or if they are aware of 
this.  
Besides that this is as entertaining an endeavour as it is potentially  uite 
productive, it may also tell us much in terms of critical thinking,  uestioning the norms 
and assumptions of societies in both the era, where the given piece of fiction takes place, 
and the present, in which the authors concerned wrote their works. 
As a research agenda, it may be interesting to expand the present in uiry in the 
future, to look at the alternative history speculative fiction covering other historical 
periods and events as well. 
 
  Take the example of the recent heated debate in Hungary about the proposition that the United States 
could have saved Hungarian Jews from deportation during WWII and that the German occupation of 
Hungary unfolded in part provoked by signals from the United States (with the matching counterfactual 
proposition implying that in the absence of those signals, the occupation would not have taken place). For 
the record, it may be worth to note (although this would obviously re uire closer examination) that in this 
author’s view neither of the above same-government different-decision counterfactual propositions should 
be assigned a high plausibility value. That is, given the unlikely winnability of a U.S. and or British decision 
to introduce airborne troops en ma  e in Hungary in defence of a Hungarian leadership of  uestionable 
reliability, with fragile (aerial) re-supply lines, with the Soviet Union advancing towards the country’s 
territory at the time from the east, and with the country’s territory being surrounded by areas controlled by 
German and German-allied forces. See the source of the above debate in: Borhi  ászl :  Amerika és Nagy-
Britannia provokálta ki a német megszállást”  America   i    and Great Britain provoked Germany into 
occupying Hungary , hvg.hu, 19 March 2019, at 
https:  hvg.hu 20190 19 Amerika es NagyBritannia provokalta ki a nemet megszallast (accessed on 
  October 2019). 
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